The representational base of consciousness
Current views of consciousness can be divided by whether the theorist accepts or rejects cognitivism about consciousness. Cognitivism as we understand it is the view that consciousness is just a form of representation or an information-processing property of a system that has representations or perhaps both. Anti-cognitivists deny this, appealing to thought experiments about inverted spectra, zombies and the like to argue that consciousness could change while nothing cognitive or representational changes. Nearly everyone agrees, however, that consciousness has a representational base. Whether consciousness simply is representational or cognitive, it at least requires representation (and cognition). In an ecumenical spirit, we will focus on this point of agreement and sketch a theory of what this representational base might be. We hope that the result will be a framework useful for investigating consciousness empirically.
|Keywords||Conscious states, First-order approach higher-order thoughts, Global representations, James, Joint consciousness, Representational base of consciousness, Self-presenting representations|
Brook, A, & Raymont, P. (Paul). (2006). The representational base of consciousness. Psyche (Pasadena) (Vol. 12).