When one focuses on words on a monitor and, say, feels a twinge of pain, one is not conscious of the words and, separately, of the pain. One is conscious of the words and the pain together, as aspects of a single experience. At least since Kant, this phenomenon has been called the unity of consciousness. A variety of approaches to characterizing unified consciousness have been tried by different theorists. Some start from the idea that a unified conscious experience is a composite of other experiences. Others assert or assume that, while a unified conscious experience will have a complex object or content, it has no experiential parts. This article returns to this disagreement. The first two ways of characterizing the unity of consciousness that are examined here are within the experiential-parts approach.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Co-consciousness, Conscious experience, Experiential-parts approach, Joint consciousness, Unity of consciousness
Publisher Oxford University Press
ISBN 978-0-19-926261-8
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0033
Raymont, P. (Paul), & Brook, A. (2009). Unity of Consciousness. In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0033