Epistemologists generally think that genuine warrant that is available to anyone must be available to everyone who is exposed to the relevant causal inputs and is able and willing to properly exercise her rationality. The motivating idea behind this requirement is roughly that an objective view is one that is not bound to a particular perspective. In this paper I ask whether the aperspectivality of our warrants is a precondition for securing the objectivity of our claims. I draw upon a Sellarsian account of perception in order to argue that it is not; rather, inquirers can have contingent properties and perspectives that give them access to forms of rational warrant and objective knowledge that others do not have. The universal accessibility of reasons, on my account, is not a precondition for the legitimacy of any actual warrant, but rather a regulative ideal governing inquiry and communication.

Additional Metadata
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2006.3.1-2.80
Journal Episteme
Citation
Kukla, R. (Rebecca). (2006). Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge. Episteme, 3(1-2), 80–95. doi:10.3366/epi.2006.3.1-2.80