Assessing State Fragility, With a Focus on Climate Change and Refugees:

A 2016 Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Report

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Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
www.carleton.ca/cifp

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## List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALC</td>
<td>Authority-Legitimacy-Capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>Country Indicators for Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<td>DRDC</td>
<td>Defence Research and Development Canada</td>
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<td>FI</td>
<td>Fragility Index</td>
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<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development Research Centre</td>
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<td>INCAF</td>
<td>International Network on Conflict and Fragility</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Program</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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Executive Summary

This Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) report provides a global fragility ranking for a total of 198 countries using 2014 data.1 South Sudan tops the list of most fragile countries according to CIFP’s ranking, followed closely by Somalia, the Central African Republic, Yemen, and Sudan.2 Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Iraq, and Syria round up our top 10. The majority of the top 20 most fragile states are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, a finding that is consistent with our historical data (www.carleton.ca/cifp). The rest are in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), namely Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and the West Bank and Gaza, and in Central and South Asia, namely Afghanistan and Pakistan.

A year-over-year comparison with CIFP’s previous rankings shows that Somalia, the Central African Republic, Afghanistan, Sudan and South Sudan rank consistently among the top poor performers and usually almost always within the top five for several years. These are countries that we would typically characterize as being trapped in fragility. Furthermore, it should be noted that most countries in the top 20 in the 2013 ranking have remained in the top 20 for the 2014 and 2015 rankings, confirming the persistence of fragility over time. This finding was detailed in our 2012 Fragility Report available on the CIFP site (http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1407.pdf).

On the other side of the ledger, Côte d’Ivoire (39th), Niger (21st), Zimbabwe (25th), Mauritania (33rd) and Kenya (26th) have moved out of the top 20, suggesting modest improvements in their performance over the last several years. Côte d’Ivoire and Mauritania, in particular, have even moved out of the top 30.

This report also provides a composite analysis of fragility using the Authority, Legitimacy and Capacity (ALC) cluster scores. The ALC assessment enables us to evaluate the different characteristics of stateness, namely in terms of identifying the sources and extent of both weaknesses and strengths; it also assists policymakers in their decisions on where and how to engage by providing additional nuance to the question of fragility.

South Sudan now tops the list of authority-challenged fragile states, a result that is indicative of the political uncertainties that have taken place in that country. Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, and Yemen round up the top five in the authority category. For the legitimacy rankings, Central African Republic, Eritrea and Somalia top the list, with Yemen, South Sudan, Syria, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also showing up in the top 20. As has been the case historically, the worst performers in the capacity rankings are from Sub-Saharan Africa; 16 countries out of the 20 in that category are from that region.

The remainder of this report examines trends in fragility, with a focus on refugees and on climate change. We highlight these linkages because of recent claims suggesting that the crisis in the Levant is to some extent driven by loss of arable land and drought. Similar assertions have been made regarding increasing weaknesses in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia for example places 11th overall and in the top 10 for Sub-Saharan Africa.

1 As is common practice with structural data reporting, we refer to this ranking as the 2015 Global Fragility ranking (see Table 1). It should be noted that the 2014 data will be updated as more indicators become available.
2 Although Somalia topped our list in previous editions of this report, new data shows that South Sudan was in fact the worst performer in the last few years.
1. Introduction

Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) are the biggest development challenge of our time. Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has been slowest in FCAS and it is expected that the poor will be even more concentrated in these countries in the future. While more than half of official development assistance (ODA) has gone to fragile states since 2007 (OECD, 2015), it is clear that beyond financial resources more effective interventions will be required to achieve the recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including the promotion of peace, justice and strong institutions (Goal 16). While the MDGs focused on the social aspects of development, the SDGs are universal, and broader in scope – including peace and security, income inequality, the environment and climate change – and will require additional investments of $2 to 3 trillion per year for the next 15 years according to some estimates.

The ongoing conflict in Syria and the resulting refugee crisis, increasing violence in Sudan/South Sudan, long-standing conflicts in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Russia’s continued involvement in Ukraine are all reminders of the fragility and violence that continue to characterize various parts of the world. Indeed, as recently reported by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), more than 100,000 people were killed in organized violence in 2014, which was the highest fatality count in twenty years (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/). Similarly, data by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) reveal a massive increase in jihadist violence across Africa since 2013. A large part of the victims can be attributed to Boko Haram, which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in early 2015 and which, over the past year, was responsible for more victims than the Islamic State proper (https://www.securityconference.de/en/activities/munich-security-report).

The objective of this report is to provide an updated account of fragility rankings using the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Fragility Index (FI) (www.carleton.ca/cifp) and its different sub-components. While much of the report focuses on the most recent state of fragility across countries (and regions), it also considers the evolution of fragility from the perspective of climate change and refugees, and discusses the policy implications of the findings. As usual, a major challenge in compiling this report was to ensure that all available data sources are included and that the overall FI and its sub-components had enough indicators in order to be representative of the actual situation in each country and over time.

Given their weak policy environments, and the persistence of fragility over time, engaging in fragile states is a long term challenge. Furthermore, policy entry in fragile states is difficult because of their level of structural complexity. In the current report, we focus mostly on structural data to profile countries along several dimensions. As described in Appendix 1, the full methodology developed by CIFP combines different levels of information – structural data, events-based data, expert and field surveys – which are necessary for both retrospective and predictive assessments (Tikuisis et al. 2012).

Fragility is a measure of the extent to which the actual practices and capacities of states differ from its idealized image (Carment et al. 2009b). Based on CIFP’s conceptualization, fragility is a matter of degree not kind. It is a measure of the extent to which the actual institutions, functions and political processes of a state accord with the strong image of sovereign state, the one reified in both theory and international law. By our definition, all states are to some extent fragile; this is, we believe, a closer representation of reality than an arbitrary line, however drawn, between weak and strong or resilient and vulnerable. While conflict-affected states are, by definition, fragile, some, but not all, fragile states are mired in deep rooted conflict and violent transitions (Tikuisis et al. 2015).
With its emphasis on a state’s structural properties, the CIFP approach to fragility is intended to capture and integrate a number of distinct academic and policy frameworks into a cohesive and coherent whole. The methodology underpinning the framework - which is described in more detail below - is based on three core assumptions. First, that conflict in fragile states is influenced by development and economic capacity problems. Second, that a lack of authority, namely the inability to control both people and territory is a key element in the emergence and protractedness of conflict. Third, that weak legitimacy is a key determinant of conflict in fragile states. This trichotomy is further parsed into six different clusters, providing a further way to differentiate among fragile states. This is a methodology that has been replicated to great degree by the OECD’s INCAF Working Group in its current efforts to measure state fragility.

The FI developed by CIFP has been in use since 2005, and our current dataset on fragility spans the period 1980-2014, which provides us with sufficient information to examine fragility across countries and over time. According to CIFP’s conceptualization, the state is the primary unit of analysis and needs to exhibit the three fundamental properties of authority, legitimacy and capacity (ALC) to function properly (or to use the World Bank’s language – security, justice and jobs). Fragility measures the extent to which the actual characteristics of a state differ from their ideal situation; states are constrained by both internal and external forces that are constantly changing over time. Consequently, all states are, to some extent, fragile; weaknesses in one or more of the ALC dimensions will negatively impact the fragility of a particular country. In that sense, we need to consider not only the extreme cases of failing, failed and collapsed states but also the ones that have the potential to fail.

Authority captures the extent to which a state possesses the ability to enact binding legislation over its population, to exercise coercive force over its sovereign territory, to provide core public goods, and to provide a stable and secure environment to its citizens and communities. Legitimacy describes the extent to which a particular government commands public loyalty to the governing regime, and to generate domestic support for that government’s legislation and policy. When it comes to practicing effective governance, many fragile states lack the legitimacy to be effective and responsive policy makers. Capacity refers to the potential for a state to mobilize and employ resources towards productive ends. States lacking in capacity may prove unable to respond effectively to sudden shocks such as natural disasters, epidemics, food shortages, or refugee flows. This ALC approach is in effect a synthesis of different theoretical foundations and three overarching streams described above: development (as measured through indicators of capacity), conflict (as measured through indicators of authority) and security (as measured by indicators of legitimacy), each of which are covered in greater detail elsewhere (Carment et al., 2006, 2009a).

Different indicators are converted to a nine-point score based on the performance of that country relative to a global sample of countries in order to calculate composite indices for authority, legitimacy and capacity for a particular country. We use a 20% threshold (that is, we must have data for at least 20% of indicators) to calculate composite indices.

In our conceptualization, a higher score is an indication that a country is performing poorly relative to other countries. Averages over a five-year time frame are calculated for global rank scores in order to avoid wide fluctuations in yearly data for country performance. Typical measures found under authority include the level of corruption and contract regulation. Legitimacy includes measures such as regime type and human rights. Capacity includes measures such as GDP per capita and foreign aid as a percentage of national income since many of the most fragile countries are credit constrained and heavily dependent on aid (OECD 2011). In addition to the FI and ALC indicators, cluster scores along several dimensions
(governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography, environment) are provided to provide further nuance to the profiling of countries. Detailed operationalisations are provided in Carment, Prest and Samy (2009).

The rest of the report proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present and discuss our latest fragility ranking along several dimensions, with a particular focus on countries of concern. Section 3 focuses on state fragility from the perspective of climate change and refugees. Section 4 concludes with some general recommendations.

2. Country rankings

Table 1 below shows our global fragility ranking for 2015 (based on 2014 data) for a total of 198 countries. The rankings indicate that South Sudan tops the list of most fragile countries followed closely by Somalia, the Central African Republic, Yemen, and Sudan. Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Iraq, and Syria round up our top 10. Ethiopia hovers just outside the top ten at 11th place which is concerning given that it is seen as a stalwart performer and a large recipient of donor assistance. If the current drought, which has been described as the worst drought in decades, continues unabated, we would expect Ethiopia’s performance to worsen over time.

Overall fragility scores above 6.5 (countries color-coded in orange in Table 1 below) are considered serious. Of those most fragile states scoring 6.5 and above, there are 19 in total. Only South Sudan scores at or above 7.5, which we consider very serious and approximating a failed, collapsed or failing state; Somalia at 7.27 and the Central African Republic at 7.24 (see Table 2 further below) are certainly not far behind and are close enough to be failing if not failed. Countries performing at or around the median are color-coded in yellow, with fragility scores ranging from 3.5 to 6.5. Countries performing well relative to others are color-coded in green, with fragility scores less than 3.5. Haiti ranks 23rd, which is indicative of some minor improvements from last year where it ranked 21st overall.
Table 1: Global Fragility Ranking – 2015

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<thead>
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<th>Rank</th>
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The majority of the top 20 most fragile states are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, a finding that is consistent with our historical data (www.carleton.ca/cifp). The rest are in the MENA region (Yemen, Iraq, the West Bank and Gaza, and Syria), and Central and South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan). A year-over-year comparison with CIFP’s previous rankings (see Table 2 below) shows that South Sudan, Somalia and the Central African Republic consistently occupy the top three positions, and that Afghanistan, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo rank consistently among the top poor performers and usually almost always within the top five. While Somalia was the worst performer in previous reports, new data shows that South Sudan has been the worst performer over the last three years. The countries that top our list are what we would typically characterize as being trapped in fragility, not only because of their poor rankings but also due to their persistently high fragility scores over an extended period of time (see Carment, Landry, Shaw and Samy (2015)).

Furthermore, it should be noted that most countries in the top 20 for 2013 have remained in the top 20 for 2014 and 2015; this is consistent with our longer time-series data that shows the persistence of fragility for the most egregious cases. On the other side of the ledger, Côte d’Ivoire (39th), Niger (21st), Zimbabwe (25th), Mauritania (33rd) and Kenya (26th) have moved out of the top 20, suggesting modest improvements in their performance over the last several years. Côte d’Ivoire and Mauritania, in particular, have even moved out of the top 30. Nineteen of the top 20 for 2015, and the entire top 20 countries for 2014, score above 6.5 or high risk.
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**ALC Analysis**

In addition to fragility rankings (as seen in Tables 1 and 2 above), CIFP provides a composite analysis of fragility using the ALC cluster scores, as defined in the previous section. The ALC assessment enables us to evaluate the different characteristics of stateness, namely in terms of identifying the sources and extent of both weaknesses and strengths; it also assists policymakers in their decisions on where and how to engage by providing additional nuance to the question of fragility. Figures 1, 2 and 3 below provide a ranking of the top 20 poorest performers in each category.

South Sudan now tops the list of authority-challenged states, a result that is indicative of the political instability in that country. The top five is rounded out by Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, and Yemen. Each of these countries faces serious and ongoing conflict and tumultuous relations with their neighbors. Historically, countries performing poorly in this category are drawn from a variety of regions beset by conflict, territorial disputes and regime change but this year’s authority rankings suggest that Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be the key locus for these kinds of problems, thus suggesting that overall performance in the region continues to deteriorate. The rankings also demonstrate the deterioration of authority in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, as conflicts in those three countries have worsened in recent years with persistent civil wars and the presence of the Islamic State. Russia’s presence in the top 20 is also worth noting, and it has been in the top 30 worst performers in this category for several years as a result of poor performance on several indicators that include those linked to terrorism/ethnic rebellion/conflict intensity/political stability/refugees, and to a lesser extent infrastructure (such as the reliability of electricity supply and access to the telephone and internet), as well as regulatory issues (informal market and paying taxes).

![Figure 1: Authority Scores - Top 20/2015](image)

![Figure 2: Legitimacy Scores - Top 20/2015](image)

![Figure 3: Capacity Scores - Top 20/2015](image)

Turning now to legitimacy rankings, historically this category has been dominated by autocratic regimes from the MENA region along with Central Asian states and North Korea. Significant changes took place in this category a few years ago with Somalia, Myanmar and Iran topping our list in 2011. Once again, a score of 7.5 and over denotes very high risk. The most noteworthy change since then is the presence of Syria as the 12th worst performer, and Yemen the 8th, a reflection of the ongoing civil wars and of the crackdown on the opposition in each country. Swaziland and Bahrain are also in the top 20, despite their relatively low fragility scores and their absence from the top 20 on either capacity or authority scores. Iran has fallen out of the top 20. These changes are reflected in how we measure legitimacy as civil and political rights, gender equality, freedom of the press and environmental protection (among other
indicators). Since 2005, Saudi Arabia has ranked among the least legitimate countries in the world (and recently moved out of the top 20). We recently commented on Saudi Arabia’s performance with respect to Canada’s decision to sell 15 billion dollars of armored vehicles to that country despite its lack of legitimacy (http://ipolitics.ca/2016/02/17/trudeau-may-come-to-bitterly-regret-the-saudi-arms-deal/)

Three countries from Central Asia are also present here: Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan is notable because of its precarious situation following the departure of Canadian forces over a year ago. Despite our 12 year presence in the country there has been little change in the country’s overall performance over time (http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1502.pdf).

Finally, as has been the case historically, the capacity rankings are dominated by Sub-Saharan African countries; except for Timor-Leste, the West Bank and Gaza, Tajikistan, and Haiti, all of the top 20 are from that region. Many of these countries are also aid dependent, a sign of their weak capacity to mobilize resources domestically (OECD 2011).

Three countries appear on all three lists: the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Chad. Countries making two of these lists are more numerous, and include Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Syria, Ethiopia, and Uganda, again with a strong presence from the Sub-Saharan Africa region. This diversity in experience speaks to the utility of the ALC framework in highlighting that states can be fragile in various ways, a point reinforced in the recent OECD INCAF report which borrows heavily from our insights (http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/).

Regional and Country-Level Analysis

Figures 4 and 5 show, respectively, regional averages organized by fragility and ALC clusters, and by six cluster areas, which include governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography, and the environment. These cluster areas are discussed further below at the country level. Gender is included as a cross-cutting theme (drawing on specific indicators from each of the six clusters). A full description of the component indicators of the six clusters and the rationale for creating them can be found on the CIFP website at www.carleton.ca/cifp.
A few results are interesting here. For instance, Figure 4 provides rankings based on fragility scores moving from left to right (represented by the red far-right column in each bloc). Although Sub-Saharan Africa is, on average, the worst performer, it is virtually tied with South Asia in terms of overall fragility. One thing to note is that South Asia scores worse on authority than Sub-Saharan Africa, and what accounts for the overall difference in fragility scores is the much higher score of Sub-Saharan Africa in the capacity cluster. Furthermore, the MENA region scores almost as poorly as Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia in legitimacy, but does better in authority and capacity, so that it is not as fragile as these two regions. Nevertheless, the MENA remains noticeably more fragile than East Asia & Pacific, Latin American & the Caribbean, and Europe & Central Asia, an important difference since last year’s report as its measures were closer to these two regions. Finally, we note that for the Latin America & Caribbean and the Europe & Central Asia regions, authority and legitimacy scores are much better than capacity.
These regional differences are evident from a different perspective. Consider figure 5, which examines regional averages by clusters. Sub-Saharan Africa is the worst performer in the economics, human development, and demography clusters. Whereas South Asia is weakest in security & crime, gender, and the environment, and is only slightly better on governance. The MENA region is the worst performer in governance and gender, but does better in other clusters. The East Asia & Pacific region performs more poorly than the MENA region in the environment cluster.

Figures 6–11 below are intended as a complement to the above discussion. They each present the 10 countries that score highest on the fragility score in each region (8 countries for South Asia, since they cover the entire region). The countries are ordered from high to low fragility going from left to right. The figures also indicate performance along the different cluster areas. In other words, not only can we see how these countries rank in terms of overall fragility (as in table 1), we can also see variations in performance along the different areas discussed above.
These figures reveal that many of the fragile states experiencing governance, and security and crime, problems are those with ongoing internal insurgency, acts of terrorism and political upheaval (for example, South Sudan, Somalia and the Central African Republic). A critical ranking, in this regard, is a country’s governance cluster, which is a measure of the ability of a regime to effectively manage its human and natural resources and to allocate them efficiently and fairly. As mentioned above, the MENA region presents the worst average performance for the governance cluster, an indication of recent clashes or political upheaval in several countries, including Syria, the West Bank and Gaza, Yemen, Bahrain, and Iraq.

The economics cluster correlates strongly with countries that have poor trading conditions, little industrialization and little or no diversity in their manufacturing sectors. The security and crime cluster covers a range of measures that tap into the presence of low intensity violence and threats to human security as well as the occurrence of terrorism and organized crime. Some countries appearing high on the security and crime list do not always rank highly in other clusters (for example Russia, Israel and the Philippines), whereas in other cases, a poor standing here correlates with overall performance in authority and legitimacy standings (for example, the Central African Republic and Somalia).

The human development rankings are indicative of the overall performance of Sub-Saharan Africa’s particularly poor track record on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), since these are closely related to the component parts of the human development cluster. The demography cluster is a measure of key attributes of population growth and distribution. It also includes the youth bulge index, a measure of the share of the population aged 14 and under. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be among the worst performers in the demography cluster: out of the 25 worst demography scores, only the Maldives, the West Bank and Gaza, Guatemala and Afghanistan are outside of Sub-Saharan Africa. The environment cluster taps into land degradation in terms of arable land available for agriculture, as well as greenhouse gas emissions, energy use, and measures of pollution. Although Sub-Saharan African countries occupy most of the list of poor performers in this cluster they are joined by Afghanistan, Haiti and Bangladesh.
Figure 9: Poorest Performing Countries/2015
East Asia & Pacific - Clusters

Figure 10: Poorest Performing Countries/2015
Latin America & the Carribean - Clusters
Climate change poses a threat not only to a state’s ecology and environment, but also to its development, security and legitimacy. As extreme climate events become more frequent and intense, continuing the trend observed in recent decades, they will likely put additional pressures on the livelihoods of populations around the world, increasing the likelihood of mass migrations to safer grounds, drawing into doubt the ability of weak governments to manage these demographic challenges such as urban-rural flight. The impacts of climate change will be felt the most by the poorest and least resilient members of society, many of whom live in rural areas of fragile states.

It is interesting to note that the literature on the determinants of fragility has tended to focus on lack of development, security and institutions, and that not much attention has been paid to climate change as a possible contributor to conflict and state fragility. Consider the case of Syria and the refugee crisis that has resulted from the ongoing civil war in that country. Most of the attention has been on how to find a peaceful resolution to the current crisis, and managing refugee flows. However, a few authors (Kelley et al, 2015; Werrell et al, 2015) have argued that a long-term drought from 2006-2011 contributed to a deterioration of the economic situation in Syria, forcing the mass migration of people from farms to cities, and adding to the political unrest that began to affect the country in 2011. However, the links even if indirect between climate change and fragility continue to be heavily disputed. While it is clear that climate change may not have caused the war in Syria, it is possible that it made a bad situation worse (Werrell et al, 2015).

Let us examine some key relationships between the CIFP fragility rankings and specific indicators pertaining to refugees and climate change. First, figures 12—14 below look at the impact of refugee populations and political and social instability, telling us how fragile states perform relative to all other countries.
Figures 12 and 13 focus on indicators related to the creation and movement of refugees. For example, in figure 12 we can see that higher fragility scores correlate strongly with the number of refugees produced. South Sudan performs among the worst in this category, and other countries are identified for comparisons.
The picture is quite different for the number of refugees hosted, as is shown on figure 13. First, there is a weak correlation between fragility and the number of refugees hosted by the country. However, on a case by case basis, the countries of concern are those hosting a large number of refugees with moderate to high fragility scores. They show up in the two far right columns and are identified as Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan and the West Bank and Gaza.

We next examine the relationship between fragility and political instability. One measure is the political stability indicator, from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home), which measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. As shown in figure 14, this correlates strongly with fragility as expected.
Figure 14: Fragility and political stability
The second topic for this section are environmental factors, in order to capture the relationship between climate change and fragility. Figure 15 shows that the rate of change in the urban share of the population correlates moderately with fragility. Looking at figure 16, which shows the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) from Yale’s Centre for Environmental Law & Policy, we see a much stronger relationship between fragility and the EPI, which incorporates various indicators related to environmental health and ecosystem vitality (a higher score for this index means better environmental performance). [I am assuming that a higher number for the EPI means better environmental performance...perhaps this can be made clearer].
Another aspect to consider when taking climate change into account is the risk of natural disasters faced by different countries. Using the World Risk Index, figure 17 shows that there is a correlation between fragility and disaster risk, but that this link is weak. Some of the countries with the highest disaster risk, as identified on the chart, score in the mid-range on fragility. This weak link underlines the multiple dimensions to fragility, and the potential importance of other factors in determining whether or not a given environmental stress will impact fragility. As could be expected, it appears from this preliminary examination that while factors related to climate change contribute to fragility, establishing a strong causal link is more complicated and may require more careful analysis, including examining specific cases.
4. Conclusions

Given the ambiguity inherent in differentiating some fragile states from others when using a single ranked index, we have demonstrated the value of a differentiated cluster driven approach inherent in the CIFP methodology. This methodology, developed over 10 years ago, examines different characteristics of stateness and various performance clusters. This extra level of detail is more useful for policy interventions. To address this requirement, this report has used the statistical clustering approach drawing on the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) project that characterizes states along three dimensions of stateness (specifically authority (A), legitimacy (L), and capacity (C)).

In this and previous reports, briefing notes and publications, we have provided an assessment of state fragility around the world. The CIFP methodology has been in place since 2005 and is now widely accepted and used by the policy and research communities. Details regarding the origins of the methodology and the theory behind it can be found in the CIFP concept note published online at www.carleton.ca/cifp and in the book: Security, Development and the Fragile State: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Policy. CIFP’s dimensions of stateness have been adopted by the OECD Development Assistance Committee.
DAC as embodied in their three pillars of stateness. These are the capacity of state structures to perform core functions; their legitimacy and accountability; and their ability to provide an enabling environment for strong economic performance to generate incomes, employment and domestic revenues.

In this report, our focus on the ALC and cluster performance across various regions provides additional evidence of the diversity of experiences with respect to state fragility and the need to continue to consider the various dimensions of fragility rather than a single ranked index. Current policy on fragile states is premised on the assumption that they progress over time as their economies grow, their institutions consolidate and poverty diminishes. But for many this is simply not the case; some experience quick reversals while some improve in certain areas, and weaken in others. Those fragile states whose stagnation is so tenacious despite generous aid programs and interventions, are considered to be stuck in a “fragility trap”. States that are persistently fragile pose an unmet challenge to policy makers, theorists, and analysts because they show little indication of how they might exit from their political, economic, and social malaise. Conventional aid policies do not appear to work as effectively in these countries as they should.

When state fragility is conceptualized as a multi-dimensional phenomenon one does not lose policy-relevant information compared to a situation where a single composite index is used. In brief, authority matters because leaders must ensure they have institutions to provide adequate services to its population and to protect it. Legitimacy matters because leaders must find ways to properly channel ethnic, social, and ideological competition that could otherwise erode the effectiveness of institutions. Capacity matters because leaders must find a way to overcome the devastating effects of poverty, over-population, rural flight, rapid urbanization, environmental degradation, etc. For example, the loss of legitimacy in state institutions in some segments of the population can result in non-compliance with the rule of law. Consequently, social and political order can break down along with the loss of national cohesion and recognition of a common authority.

In addition to the need for a differentiated approach, further investments should be made to evaluate the correlations linking climate change to fragility, to determine why some countries stuck in a fragility trap remain so and why despite considerable donor investments some countries such as the Central African Republic and Afghanistan remain mired at the bottom. Our current research agenda considers these different questions but more remains to be done, in particular working with donors to confront a basic problem, namely that of fragile states transitions.
References


About CIFP

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy is an independent research organisation based at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, in Ottawa, Canada, focusing on fragile state, democracy and governance, aid monitoring, conflict risk analysis, early warning and mainstreaming aid effectiveness. The project has over 18 years’ experience in developing methodologies, training and working with local, national and regional organizations and governments. Funders, supporters and users include the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Department of National Defence (DND), Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Conflict Prevention Network, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, the World Food Program, Criminal intelligence Services of Canada, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), The International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the OECD’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), and private sector firms, including extractive industries.

About the Authors

David Carment is a full Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and has over 20 years’ experience in policy relevant research on fragile states, conflict prevention, mainstreaming risk analysis and aid allocation. He led a CIDA funded initiative on mainstreaming research on failed and fragile states into policy making over the 2005-2008 period. He also served DAC-OECD’s working group on fragile states. He has developed risk analysis training workshops for NGOs in Africa, Asia and Europe. He is the editor of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal.

Yiagadeesen (Teddy) Samy (PhD) is an Associate Professor of International Affairs and the Associate Director (MA Program) at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. He is the author and co-author of several peer-reviewed articles and book chapters on trade and labor standards, state fragility, small island developing states, foreign aid and income inequality. He has co-authored a book (with David Carment and Stewart Prest) on fragile states, and published by Routledge in 2009, and was the co-editor of the 2013 volume of Canada Among Nations on Canada-Africa relations. He and Carment have presented their work at the Center for Global Development (CGD), World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) and the annual International Studies Association (ISA) meetings.

Simon Langlois-Bertrand holds a PhD in International Affairs from Carleton University, and is a Fellow of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. He has been collaborating on the CIFP project since 2008, helping in managing and improving the database of indicators. He has also collaborated in analyzing fragility trends in recent years.
Appendix 1

As part of a broader effort to enable more effective international engagement in failed and fragile states, a team from Carleton’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project (CIFP - www.carleton.ca/cifp) has been working with the Canadian government in a multi-year initiative that has three objectives. First, we have developed a number of wide-ranging tools that encompass, among other things, the monitoring, forecasting, and evaluation of failed and fragile states, as well as the assessment of supporting policies intended to address the development, security, and economic challenges they represent. The following diagram outlines the full extent of the CIFP analytical framework - known as the CIFP Net Assessment (CNA) - identifying the various modules involved in the analysis.

Second, the project presents a methodology for evaluating individual country performance. This drill-down capability provides guidance to programming officers at CIDA and other government departments working in complex and fragile environments. It enables them to focus efforts and resources on the root structural causes of fragility rather than the outward symptoms of the problem, while simultaneously identifying areas of comparative strength within the state that may provide valuable points of entry for international development efforts. At the same time, it allows them to avoid decisions likely to further destabilize the country through otherwise unforeseen consequences of programming activities.

Third, the project engages in statistical and theoretical research, regarding the nature of the relationship between state fragility and selected key variables. The findings provide some insight into the varied causes of state fragility. Several important avenues requiring further study have been extensively covered in publication form. Such research is particularly relevant, given that the now broadly acknowledged lack of progress toward global attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is to a certain extent explained through the poor performance of the world’s fragile and failed states (Samy and Carment,
Furthermore, progress on the newly-adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will require significant resources and focus on fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS).

Innovations in Research Design and Methodologies for Risk Analysis, Country Monitoring and Impact Assessment

Effective policy in fragile states requires a solid analytic base that:

- Is sufficiently nuanced to allow the observer to understand differentiated performance in different areas of fragility, rather than presenting processes and performance in an oversimplified manner;
- Identifies both positive and negative sectors in each state’s performance, thereby highlighting potential points of entry for external actors;
- Combines real time dynamic event and actor analysis with long-term structural information to counter time lags between developments on the ground and their reflection in statistical indicators and resulting programming priorities and timelines;
- Provides policy relevant diagnosis by matching the analysis to the end user’s operational capacity; and
- Provides an evaluative framework with which to assess policy impact both before and after programs are implemented.

The relationship between these objectives and the policy cycle are shown here:
In order to address these policy objectives, the CIFP Fragile States Project has developed a three tiered multi-source, multi method policy relevant tool kit. Our argument has been that if they are to have any significant impact, fragile state policies require a multifaceted but focused analysis based on an appreciation of the relative risks that exist within and between states and, more importantly, the development of effective policy-relevant tools for international engagement. One of the key innovations has been the construction of a web-based country monitoring tool, shown here:

First, structural data, such as GDP per capita, political indices and human rights measures, provide a sturdy platform on which to build country analysis. Structural data are compiled by recognized organizations, sometimes in partnership with host nations. Structural data allows the end user to rank countries for quick assessments of performance within sub-sectors. Country level structural data also enable comparative analysis. For example, one may compare the voting rates among women in Ghana and Cote D'Ivoire using data collected by the UNDP or the World Bank. Using the same indicators and econometric analysis it is possible to determine in what way women’s voting rates in Ghana and Cote D'Ivoire are influenced by education levels, rural and urban environments, and formal employment.

Second, the systematic collection and evaluation of dynamic data also known as events-based information analysis, is highly relevant to fragile states programming and processes. Dynamic data analysis whether it draws on information from media sources or country experts, is useful for identifying up-to-date trends in popular perceptions, preferences and stakeholder behaviors. Dynamic data analysis can add considerable value through regularized and standardized reporting. It can deepen understanding of trends found in structural data, and can highlight trend reversals. For example, a statistical study may show a steady decline in violent events over a series of years, but current events may evidence a sudden surge in violent demonstrations, one that will show up in structural data only until after the fact. Events-based information can also provide a window into stakeholder perceptions, how they are reacting to real-time changes and why they are doing so.

The figure below shows patterns of decline in governance performance approximately a year prior to the declared state of emergency in Pakistan in 2007. The red regression line in the graph represents the
overall trend in events. Clearly, in the case of Pakistan, there was considerable evidence of an approaching crisis. Such evidence, if properly understood, can allow policymakers to respond in a timely fashion to impending problems, rather than simply responding after the fact.

Third, the project employs qualitative information, as a valuable complement to the systematic collection of statistical data, as it uncovers details and nuance. Put simply, when correctly structured, expert opinion can provide the "why" behind the "what" revealed through structural and dynamic data analysis. Expert opinions can provide detailed insight into specific issue areas, as well as offer ideas about what areas deserve the most attention going forward, either because they are functioning well and can be used to propagate positive reform in other parts of the governance system, or because they are weakening and threaten to undermine stability and development in other sectors. For example, CIFP’s expert survey on Ghana highlighted the problem of low popular expectations of government as an obstacle to improving governance performance. Ghanaians had become so accustomed to limited government capacity that they had ceased to seriously challenge the government on its service delivery.
Appendix 2

Cluster Impact Assessment Questions for Desk Officers, Field Officers, Analysts and Project Managers

Does the engagement:

Security:
Deter the outbreak or perpetration of specific possibly imminent acts of violence?
Prevent actual low-level eruptions of occasional violence from escalating?
Protect vulnerable groups from likely attacks of violence?
Relieve the sense of threat, fear and anxieties expressed by various groups toward one another?
Contribute to security sector reform, especially the professionalization and modernization of armed forces?
Enable effective civilian oversight of the armed forces?
Reduce the state’s dependence on foreign military presence?
Promote regional stability?

Crime:
Strengthen criminal justice systems, including police, judiciary, and prisons?
Assist the state in modernizing its criminal code, particularly with respect to its treatment of vulnerable sections of the population, including women, children, minorities, and indigenous groups?
Contribute to the rule of law?
Provide useful strategies to prevent and/or respond to crimes against humanity, war crimes, rape, and other particularly destabilizing forms of criminality?
Support measures to reduce venal corruption?
Limit key destabilizing criminal activities, including drug production and trafficking in small arms, humans, drugs, kidnapping, and extortion?
Provide replacement opportunities for economic activity in the licit economy whenever attempting to limit or extinguish black market activity?

Governance:
Engage opposed top-level political actors in new contacts and communications?
Enter new substantive ideas and options into debate and dialogue that are seriously considered or adopted as compromise solutions of outstanding disputes?
Help the parties’ leaders reach specific agreements on disputes and public policy issues?
Change the perceptions and attitudes that the leadership groups held toward one another?
Soften the stridency and tone of public debate and statements?

Set up or strengthen formal institutions and procedures that encompass broad segments of the population in more democratic or consultative forms of decision-making?

Create new informal venues and channels through which disputes and issues can be addressed by the protagonists?

Help build autonomous spheres of social power that are active outside the official organisations of both government and opposition political parties and organisations (civil society), which can counteract the divisive and antagonistic tendencies of political leaders?

Enable meaningful participation of marginalized groups in mainstream political discussions?

Support a professional and politically independent civil service?

Protect the freedom of the press?

**Economy**

Support professional and transparent government budgetary practices?

Encourage long-term job creation?

Reduce aid dependency?

Reduce external debt?

Enhance tax collection efficiency?

Provide some protection against external economic shocks?

Enable economic diversification?

Provide microeconomic incentives to reduce dependency on black market economies and increase participation in the licit economy?

Reinforce contract enforcement?

Encourage sustainable, long-term FDI?

Increase the overall standard of living?

Encourage female participation in the workforce?

Support development of state capacity and infrastructure?

**Human Development**

Stimulate active, salient efforts to address structural disparities among the main groups at odds, by achieving more equitable distributions among them of basic material and economic needs, such as income, educational opportunities, housing, health services?
Upgrade the skills and understanding of those significant organised groups who are promoting conflict prevention and reconciliation processes, so they can be more effective advocates or implementers of these goals?

Cause, or threaten to cause, such a rapid redistribution of resources from “haves” to “have-nots” that the insecurity of the former is increased, thus inviting violent backlash, or the “have-nots” are enticed to use violence to obtain more redistribution?

Provide necessary medical services?

Provide emergency treatment for HIV/AIDS?

Enable the growth of a local medical capacity?

**Environment**
Support land reform that addresses systemic inequities in a manner that fairly reimburses those displaced during the process?

Provide sustainable access to potable water?

Limit pollution and other factors responsible for environmental degradation?

Limit or halt rates of deforestation, while providing viable and reasonable alternate sources of income for those currently involved in the industry?

Institute dispute resolution systems to address current or potential disputes over the allocation of limited resources

**Population and Demography**
Support strategies designed to moderate excessive population growth?

Address the problems created by excessive regional population density?

Support efforts to reduce inter-ethno-religious tensions?

Support voices of moderation and mutual acceptance against radical politico-religious movements?

Address issues created by any youth bulge?

Help the state to cope with pressures created by urban growth rates and rural-urban migration?
CIFP Potential Impact Assessment:
Horizontal/Cluster Impact Analysis cont’d

CIFP analyses potential impact of Canadian engagement by indicator cluster, giving some indication of the extent to which the proposed engagement policy will actually affect the underlying causes of fragility. Key impacts include:

**Economy**
- Supporting professional, transparent budgetary practices
- Encouraging long-term job creation
- Reducing aid dependency and external debt
- Encouraging female participation in the workforce
- Support development of state capacity and infrastructure

**Human Development**
- Addressing intercommunal structural disparities
- Reducing maternal and infant mortality
- Enhancing educational opportunities both in absolute and gender-specific terms
- Improving standard of living

**Crime**
- Professionalizing the police, judiciary, and prisons
- Improving the state’s legal protection for women, children, minorities, and indigenous groups
- Supporting measures to reduce venal corruption
- Limit drug production, trafficking in small arms, humans, and drugs; kidnapping, and extortion

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CIFP Potential Impact Assessment:
Horizontal/Cluster Impact Analysis cont’d

CIFP analyses potential impact of Canadian engagement by indicator cluster, giving some indication of the extent to which the proposed engagement policy will actually affect the underlying causes of fragility. Key impacts include:

**Population and Demography**
- Supporting efforts to moderate excessive population growth
- Addressing problems created by excessive regional population density
- Supporting efforts to reduce intercommunal tensions
- Supporting voices of moderation and mutual acceptance against radical politico-religious movements
- Addressing issues created by the youth bulge
- Helping the state to cope with urban growth rates

**Environment**
- Supporting land reform that addresses systemic inequities
- Providing sustainable access to potable water
- Limiting pollution and other factors responsible for environmental degradation
- Limiting or reversing rates of deforestation, while providing viable and reasonable alternate sources of income for those currently involved in the industry
CIFP Potential Impact Assessment: Horizontal/Cluster Impact Analysis

CIFP analyses potential impact of Canadian engagement by indicator cluster, giving some indication of the extent to which the proposed engagement policy will actually affect the underlying causes of fragility. Key impacts include:

**Security**
- Detering violence
- Protecting vulnerable groups
- Enhancing general perceptions of safety
- Protecting vital infrastructure
- Participating Security Sector Reform
- Enabling effective civilian oversight of the armed forces
- Reducing state dependence on foreign military presence

**Governance**
- Engaging actors on all sides of the dispute(s)
- Encouraging problem-solving approaches
- Enhancing intercommunal trust
- Strengthening domestic decision-making apparatuses
- Enabling the meaningful political participation of marginalized groups
- Supporting a professional and politically independent civil service