In this chapter I provide an overview of the political economy of taxation in democratic states by considering the three most important issues in the field: (1) the evolution of the power to tax in (what are now) the mature constitutional democracies; (2) the nature and determinants of modern tax structures; and (3) redistribution in pluralistic societies over various horizons and in the face of economic shocks. The discussion considers the ideas and models that have arisen as scholars have grappled with these related issues, and points to some of the outstanding problems that may be worth pursuing in future research.

Additional Metadata
Keywords taxation, Oxford Handbook, political economy, public choice, power to tax, tax structure, fiscal redistribution
JEL Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior (jel D72), Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation (jel D78), Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue (jel H2), Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies (jel H24)
Publisher Department of Economics
Series Carleton Economic Papers (CEP)
Winer, S. (2016). The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution (No. CEP 16-15). Carleton Economic Papers (CEP). Department of Economics.