Homo Moralis : preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching
What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals’ preferences are their private information, a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis. At one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff. At the opposite end is homo kantiensis, who does what would be “the right thing to do,” in terms of payoffs, if all others would do likewise. We show that the stable degree of morality - the weight placed on the moral goal - is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact.
|Keywords||evolutionary stability, preference evolution, moral values, incomplete, information, assortative matching.|
|JEL||Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games (jel C73), Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles (jel D03)|
|Publisher||Department of Economics|
|Series||Carleton Economic Papers (CEP)|
|Note||This version: May 14, 2013.|
Alger, Ingela, & Weibull, Jörgen W. (2013). Homo Moralis : preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching (No. CEP 12-01). Carleton Economic Papers (CEP). Department of Economics.
|MacOdrum Library Borrow|