The paper establishes that equality between the average return of factors engaged in rent-seeking and those in productive activity does not generally imply equality between the efficiency losses from rent-seeking and the rents themselves; such equality is often assumed in the literature. A stylized CGE-model is used to illustrate the sensitivity of the estimated losses to the specification of the rent-seeking mechanism. It also illustrates the interdependence between the effects of taxes or subsidies and rent-seeking. For example, when rent-seeking involves post-secondary graduates competing for government jobs which yield incomes from corruption, the efficiency losses are affected by subsidies to education.

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Journal Journal of Development Economics
Blomqvist, Å, & Mohammad, S. (Sharif). (1986). Controls, corruption, and competitive rent-seeking in LDCs. Journal of Development Economics, 21(1), 161–180. doi:10.1016/0304-3878(86)90045-3