This paper examines the institutional and functional aspects of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). The Taliban’s coercive approach and its entire reliance on “war-making” to “state-making” shows the difficulty of the transformation of an insurgent group into a state structure. The Taliban was primarily capable of establishing a two-track system of governance. However, the assessment of the IEA’s institutional and functional capabilities shows that the military–political organization formed by the Taliban lacked statehood in all three areas of legitimacy, authority and capacity.

Afghanistan, civil war, Insurgency, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, state-making, Taliban, war-making
dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2017.1374598
Small Wars and Insurgencies
Department of Political Science

Ibrahimi, S.Y. (S. Yaqub). (2017). The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): ‘War-Making and State-Making’ as an Insurgency Strategy. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 28(6), 947–972. doi:10.1080/09592318.2017.1374598