This paper examines the institutional and functional aspects of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). The Taliban’s coercive approach and its entire reliance on “war-making” to “state-making” shows the difficulty of the transformation of an insurgent group into a state structure. The Taliban was primarily capable of establishing a two-track system of governance. However, the assessment of the IEA’s institutional and functional capabilities shows that the military–political organization formed by the Taliban lacked statehood in all three areas of legitimacy, authority and capacity.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Afghanistan, civil war, Insurgency, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, state-making, Taliban, war-making
Persistent URL
Journal Small Wars and Insurgencies
Ibrahimi, S.Y. (S. Yaqub). (2017). The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): ‘War-Making and State-Making’ as an Insurgency Strategy. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 28(6), 947–972. doi:10.1080/09592318.2017.1374598