This article examines the use of presidential veto power in Russia from 1994 to 1998. Russia's 1993 constitution enables the president to veto legislation, but allows the bicameral Federal Assembly to overturn vetoes with a two-thirds majority. President Boris Yeltsin was a controversial figure in Russia's difficult post-communist transition, and although he had considerable executive powers, his power to veto legislation has rarely been examined as an independent variable which shapes Russian politics. This article looks at patterns of presidential vetoing in Russia within their comparative and historical context, and argues that unpredictable vetoing has become a substantial issue that has aggravated executive-legislative relations. Increasingly, the parliamentary opposition challenged presidential vetoes, with profound implications for the future constitutional order in Russia.

Canadian Journal of Political Science
Department of Political Science

Chandler, A. (2001). Presidential veto power in post-communist Russia, 1994-1998. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 34(3), 487–516.