The political economy of government size
We contribute to the political economy of public-sector growth by integrating three essential elements (i) the 'demand' for government stemming from attempts to coercively redistribute, as well as from demand for public services, often analyzed in a median voter framework; (ii) the 'supply' of taxable activities emphasized in Leviathan and other models of taxation; and (iii) the distribution of 'political influence' when influence and economic welfare are distinct. We combine these elements in a spatial voting framework, and use the comparative static properties of the model to shed light on empirical results in the literature.
|Keywords||Coercive redistribution, Political influence, Probabilistic spatial voting, Size of government|
|Journal||European Journal of Political Economy|
Tridimas, G. (George), & Winer, S. (2005). The political economy of government size. European Journal of Political Economy, 21(3), 643–666. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2004.11.003