We contribute to the political economy of public-sector growth by integrating three essential elements (i) the 'demand' for government stemming from attempts to coercively redistribute, as well as from demand for public services, often analyzed in a median voter framework; (ii) the 'supply' of taxable activities emphasized in Leviathan and other models of taxation; and (iii) the distribution of 'political influence' when influence and economic welfare are distinct. We combine these elements in a spatial voting framework, and use the comparative static properties of the model to shed light on empirical results in the literature.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Coercive redistribution, Political influence, Probabilistic spatial voting, Size of government
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2004.11.003
Journal European Journal of Political Economy
Citation
Tridimas, G. (George), & Winer, S. (2005). The political economy of government size. European Journal of Political Economy, 21(3), 643–666. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2004.11.003