Abstract. The article examines the role of science and technology in the nuclear regulatory process by focusing on Canadian efforts over the past two decades to regulate the health of Canadian uranium miners. While analysed in the general context of the political economy of the Canadian uranium industry, the article examines in particular a number of aspects of the role of science and technology in the nuclear regulatory process, including Hafele's concept of ‘hypotheticality’, the openness of the regulatory process, the relationships between causal knowledge and political evidence, the relationship between the regulators' research priorities and the lack of applied controls and monitoring technology, the degree of deference paid by domestic regulators to international standard‐setting bodies, and finally the redistributive effects encouraged by a lack of appropriate science and technology priorities. The regulation of the health of Canadian uranium miners has not been an example of regulatory virtue. The excesses of scientific caution shown in the processes of handling causal knowledge and evidence, when combined with the regulators' split personality of being both regulator as well as quasi‐promoter and manager of the nuclear and uranium industry, allowed only the most intermittent attention to be given to uranium workers. Copyright