In this paper, I argue that the conscious awareness one has of oneself as acting, i.e., agentive awareness, is not a type of sensory awareness. After providing some set up in Sect. 1, I move on in Sect. 2 to sketch a profile of sensory agentive experiences (SAEs) as representational states with sensory qualities by which we come to be aware of ourselves as performing actions. In Sect. 3, I critique two leading arguments in favor of positing such sensory experiences: the argument from pathology and the argument from cognitive impenetrability. Since neither of these arguments succeeds, the case for positing SAEs is dealt a significant blow. I proceed in Sect. 4 to advance my positive argument against SAEs. The argument runs as follows: If SAEs exist, then they must exist in some sensory modality or set of sensory modalities. Either the relevant sensory modalities are ones that we already recognize, or they are novel sensory modalities. I will argue that neither of these options is workable, and so we have nowhere to locate SAEs. Agentive awareness is not sensory awareness.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Action theory, Agentive awareness, Comparator model, Consciousness, Phenomenology, Sense of agency
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0332-x
Journal Philosophical Studies
Citation
Mylopoulos, M. (2014). Agentive awareness is not sensory awareness. Philosophical Studies, 172(3), 761–780. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0332-x