Common-sense folk psychology and mainstream philosophy of action agree about decisions: These are under an agent's direct control, and are thus intentional actions for which agents can be held responsible. I begin this paper by presenting a problem for this view. In short, since the content of the motivational attitudes that drive deliberation and decision remains open-ended until the moment of decision, it is unclear how agents can be thought to exercise control over what they decide at the moment of deciding. I note that this problem might motivate a non-actional view of deciding-a view that decisions are not actions, but are instead passive events of intention acquisition. For without an understanding of how an agent might exercise control over what is decided at the moment of deciding, we lack a good reason for maintaining commitment to an actional view of deciding. However, I then offer the required account of how agents exercise control over decisions at the moment of deciding. Crucial to this account is an understanding of the relation of practical deliberation to deciding, an understanding of skilled deliberative activity, and the role of attention in the mental action of deciding.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Control, deciding, mental action, practical deliberation, skill
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.971035
Journal Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Citation
Shepherd, J. (2015). Deciding as intentional action: Control over decisions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 93, pp. 335–351). doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.971035