What are the folk-conceptual connections between free will and consciousness? In this paper I present results which indicate that consciousness plays central roles in folk conceptions of free will. When conscious states cause behavior, people tend to judge that the agent acted freely. And when unconscious states cause behavior, people tend to judge that the agent did not act freely. Further, these studies contribute to recent experimental work on folk philosophical affiliation, which analyzes folk responses to determine whether folk views are consistent with the view that free will and determinism are incompatible (incompatibilism) or with the opposite view (compatibilism). Conscious causation of behavior tends to elicit pro-free will judgments, even when the causation takes place deterministically. Thus, when controlling for consciousness, many folk seem to be compatibilists. However, participants who disagree with the deterministic or cognitive scientific descriptions given of human behavior tend to give incompatibilist responses.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Consciousness, Experimental philosophy, Free will
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.03.004
Journal Consciousness and Cognition
Citation
Shepherd, J. (2012). Free will and consciousness: Experimental studies. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(2), 915–927. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2012.03.004