2006-10-30
Nuisance suits and contingent attorney fees
Publication
Publication
Review of Law and Economics , Volume 2 - Issue 3
We demonstrate that contingent attorney fees can play a strategic role in a model of nuisance suits. Specifically, the use of contingency fees makes the plaintiff's threat to go to trial credible. In contrast to previous economic analyses, we show that contingency fees do encourage nuisance suits.
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| doi.org/10.2202/1555-5879.1045 | |
| Review of Law and Economics | |
| Organisation | Department of Economics |
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Chen, Z. (2006). Nuisance suits and contingent attorney fees. Review of Law and Economics, 2(3). doi:10.2202/1555-5879.1045
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