Information Asymmetry and Risk Transfer Markets
We provide a tractable model of counterparty risk in an intermediated risk transfer market, and analyze the consequences of this risk being private information. We show that unknown type information can be revealed when large trades are observable; however, the allocation is shown to be constrained inefficient. The inefficiency is highlighted by considering the imposition of a transaction tax, which can improve welfare by encouraging more information revelation and increasing risk transfer. The results suggest that increased transparency and/or central counterparty arrangements in over-the-counter derivative markets may promote transparency of counterparty risk.
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|Department of Economics|
|Carleton Economics Working Papers (CEWP)|
|Organisation||Department of Economics|
Stephens, E, & J.R. Thompson (James R.). (2016). Information Asymmetry and Risk Transfer Markets (No. CEP 16-04). Carleton Economics Working Papers (CEWP). Department of Economics.