Conceptual Atomism (CA) is the view that psychological concepts are atoms (no internal structure, no necessary relations to other concepts). CA is a psychological/semantic theory. I show that CA has become mixed up with a separate, meta-semantic project that seeks to naturalize content, and that this Naturalized Conceptual Atomism has ended up in the self-defeating position of positing non-atomic structures for a large number of concepts. The solution is to separate the two projects again, and allow them to develop on their own.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Conceptual Atomism, semantic theory, Naturalized Conceptual Atomism, cognitive science
Publisher Department of Cognitive Science
Series Cognitive Science Technical Report Series
Scott, Sam. (2001). The Psychological Implausibility of Naturalized Content. Technical Report 2001-05. Cognitive Science Technical Report Series. Department of Cognitive Science.