While there seems to be much evidence that perceptual states can occur without being conscious, some theorists recently express scepticism about unconscious perception. We explore here two kinds of such scepticism: Megan Peters and Hakwan Lau’s experimental work regarding the well-known problem of the criterion — which seems to show that many purported instances of unconscious perception go unreported but are weakly conscious — and Ian Phillips’ theoretical consideration, which he calls the ‘problem of attribution’ — the worry that many purported examples of unconscious perception are not perceptual, but rather merely informational and subpersonal. We argue that these concerns do not undermine the evidence for unconscious perception and that this sceptical approach results in a dilemma for the sceptic, who must either deny that there is unconscious mentality generally or explain why perceptual states are unique in the mind such that they cannot occur unconsciously. Both options, we argue, are problematic.

Consciousness, Masking, Perception, Perceptual processing, Problem of criterion
Journal of Consciousness Studies
Department of Philosophy

Berger, J. (Jacob), & Mylopoulos, M. (2019). On scepticism about unconscious perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26(11-12), 8–32.