It is well known that the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the IETF standard interdomain routing protocol, is vulnerable to a variety of attacks, and that a single misconfigured or malicious BGP speaker could result in large-scale service disruption. In this paper, we present Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP) - -a proposal for securing BGP, including an architectural overview, design details for significant aspects, and preliminary security and operational analysis. psBGP differs from other security proposals (e.g., S-BGP and soBGP) in that it makes use of a single-level PKI for AS number authentication, a decentralized trust model for verifying the propriety of IP prefix origin, and a rating-based stepwise approach for AS_PATH (integrity) verification. psBGP trades off the strong security guarantees of S-BGP for presumed-simpler operation, e.g., using a PKI with a simple structure, with a small number of certificate types, and of manageable size. psBGP is designed to successfully defend against various (nonmalicious and malicious) threats from uncoordinated BGP speakers, and to be incrementally deployed with incremental benefits.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Authentication, BGP, Certificates, Interdomain routing, Public-key infrastructure, Secure routing protocols, Trust
Persistent URL
Journal ACM Transactions on Information and System Security
Van Oorschot, P, Wan, T. (Tao), & Kranakis, E. (2007). On interdomain routing security and pretty secure BGP (psBGP). ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 10(3). doi:10.1145/1266977.1266980