In this paper, I develop Mauricio Suárez's distinction between denotation, epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic representation. I then outline an interpretational account of epistemic representation, according to which a vehicle represents a target for a certain user if and only if the user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target, which would allow them to perform valid (but not necessarily sound) surrogative inferences from the model to the system. The main difference between the interpretational conception I defend here and Suárez's inferential conception is that the interpretational account is a substantial account-interpretation is not just a "symptom" of representation; it is what makes something an epistemic representation of a something else. Copyright 2007 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

Additional Metadata
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1086/519478
Journal Philosophy of Science
Citation
Contessa, G. (2007). Scientific representation, interpretation, and surrogative reasoning. Philosophy of Science, 74(1), 48–68. doi:10.1086/519478