In this paper, I distinguish two often-conflated theses-the thesis that all dispositions are intrinsic properties and the thesis that the causal bases of all dispositions are intrinsic properties-and argue that the falsity of the former does not entail the falsity of the latter. In particular, I argue that extrinsic dispositions are a counterexample to first thesis but not necessarily to the second thesis, because an extrinsic disposition does not need to include any extrinsic property in its causal basis. I conclude by drawing some general lessons about the nature of dispositions and their relation to their causal bases.

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Journal Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Contessa, G. (2012). Do Extrinsic Dispositions Need Extrinsic Causal Bases?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(3), 622–638. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00435.x