This text seeks to situate Being and Time in the line of the ancient philosophical tradition of care for self (epiméleia heautou). After a brief description of the main features of this tradition as portrayed by Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot, the author presents the elements of Being in Time in favour and those against such a link. Her hypothesis appears to encounter a major objection in the explicit refusal of Heidegger to speak of Selbstsorge. But an attentive examination of the meaning of this reserve (the rejection of selfhood as a transparent and introspective relationship of the soul to itself) makes it in reality possible to show Heidegger to be one of the most consequent philosophers in the tradition of care for the soul. Indeed, by highlighting the constitutive link between selfhood and care, Heidegger shows the very condition of possibility of the tradition of care for the soul: that the self is not given as a thing, but may contribute to its own transformation through a specific form of care.

Additional Metadata
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2014.901698
Journal Philosophical Papers
Citation
Larivee, A. (2014). Being and time and the ancient philosophical tradition of care for the self: A tense or harmonious relationship?. Philosophical Papers, 43(1), 123–144. doi:10.1080/05568641.2014.901698