The article provides an outline of the economics of the public sector and of its structure when collective choice is regarded as an essential component of the analysis. It identifies the key issues that must be faced by political scientists and economists who insist that collective institutions cannot be ignored in research on taxation and public budgets. It also reviews various alternatives to the median voter model; these alternatives are frameworks that interpret public policies as equilibrium outcomes in a multidimensional setting.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Collective choice, Collective institutions, Economics structure, Framework of analysis, Key issues, Median voter model, Public budgets, Public policies, Public sector, Taxation
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0025
Citation
Winer, S.L, & Hettich, W. (Walter). (2008). Structure and Coherence in the Political Economy of Public Finance. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0025